For reasons that are not always evident at the time, some financial events, such as the devaluation of a currency or an announcement of default on sovereign debt obligations, trigger an immediate and startling adverse chain reaction among countries within a region and in some cases across regions. This phenomenon, which we dub "fast and furious" contagion, was manifest after the floatation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997, as it quickly triggered financial turmoil across east Asia. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines were hit the hardest-by December 1997, their currencies had depreciated (on average) by about 75 percent. Similarly, when Russia defaulted on its sovereign bonds on August 18, 1998, the effects were felt not only in several of the former Soviet republics, but also in Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, many other emerging markets, and the riskier segments of developed markets. 1 The economic impact of these shocks on the countries unfortunate enough to be affected included declines in equity prices, spikes in the cost of borrowing, scarcity in the availability of international capital, and declines in the value of their currencies and in output. Table 1 presents summary material for recent contagion episodes. The first column lists the country, the date that marks the beginning of the episode, the nature of the shock, and currency market developments in the crisis country, while the remaining columns include information on the existence and nature of common external shocks, the suspected main mechanism for propagation across national borders, and the countries that were most affected.
The challenge for economic researchers is to explain why the number of financial crises that did not have significant international consequences is far greater than those that did. It is no surprise that a domestic crisis (no matter how deep) in countries that are approximately autarkic (either voluntarily or otherwise) will not likely have immediate repercussions in world capital markets. The countries may be large (China or India) or comparatively small (Bolivia and Guinea-Bissau.) More intriguing cases of "contagion that never happened" are where the crisis country is relatively large (at least by emerging market standards) and is reasonably well integrated to the rest of the world through trade or finance. Along with the fast and furious contagion episodes, these are the cases we focus on in this paper.
Some recent examples of financial crises with limited immediate consequences include Brazil's devaluation of the real on January 13, 1999 and eventual flotation on Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina are relatively large emerging markets, these episodes could have been-at least potentially--as highly "contagious" as the Thai and Russian crises.
Nonetheless, financial markets shrugged off these events, despite the fact that it was evident at the time that some of these shocks would have trade and real sector repercussions on neighboring countries over the medium term. 2 Table 2 presents some summary material for these episodes, in a format parallel to Table 1 .
This paper seeks to address the central question of why financial contagion across borders occurs in some cases but not others. 3 Throughout the paper, we stress that there are three key elements-an abrupt reversal in capital inflows, surprise announcements, and a leveraged common creditor (the unholy trinity)--that distinguish the cases where contagion occurs from those where it does not.
First, contagion usually followed on the heels of a surge in inflows of international capital and, more often than not, the initial shock or announcement pricked the capital flow bubble, at least temporarily. The capacity for a swift and drastic reversal of capital flows-the so-called "sudden stop" problem-played a significant role. 4 Second, the announcements that set off the chain reactions came as a surprise to financial markets. The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated events appears critical, as forewarning allows investors to adjust their portfolios in anticipation of the event.
Third, in all cases where there were significant immediate international repercussions, a leveraged common creditor was involved-be it commercial banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, or individual bondholders-who helped to propagate the contagion across national borders.
Before turning to the question of what elements distinguish the cases where contagion occurs from those where it does not, however, we provide a brief tour of the main theoretical explanations for contagion and the most salient empirical findings on the channels of propagation.
What is Contagion?
Since the term "contagion" has been used liberally and taken on multiple meanings, it is useful to clarify how it will be used in this paper. We refer to contagion as an episode in which there are significant immediate effects in a number of countries following an event--that is, when the consequences are fast and furious and evolve over a matter of hours or days. This "fast and furious" reaction is a contrast to cases in which the initial international reaction to the news is muted. The latter cases do not preclude the emergence of gradual and protracted effects that may cumulatively have major economic consequences. We refer to these gradual death by a thousand cuts cases as spillovers.
Common external shocks, such as changes in international interest rates or oil prices, are also not automatically included in our working definition of contagion. Only if there is "excess comovement" in financial and economic variables across countries in response to a common shock do we consider it contagion.
Theories of Contagion
Through what channels does a financial crisis in one country spread across international borders? Some models have emphasized investor behavior that gives rise to the possibility of herding and fads. It is no doubt possible (if not appealing to many economists) that such "irrational exuberance," to quote Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, influence the behavior of capital flows and financial markets and exacerbate the booms as well as the busts. Other models stress economic linkages through trade or finance. This section provides a selective discussion of theories of contagion. The main message conveyed here-consistent with our unholy trinity proposition--is that financial linkages (i.e., cross border capital flows and common creditors) and investor behavior figure the most prominently in the theoretical explanations of contagion. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) model the fragility of mass behavior as a consequence of informational cascades. 5 An information cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, after observing the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his or her own information. Under relatively mild conditions, cascades will almost surely start, and often they will be wrong.
Herding
In those circumstances, a few early individuals can have a disproportionate effect.
Changes in the underlying value of alternative decisions can lead to "fads," that is drastic and seemingly whimsical swings in mass behavior without obvious external stimulus.
Banerjee ( This characteristic of the model captures (to some extent) the phenomena of "excess volatility" in asset markets, or the frequent and unpredictable changes in fashions.
Another story suggests that the channels of transmission arise from the global diversification of financial portfolios in the presence of information asymmetries. Calvo and Mendoza (1998) , for instance, present a model where the fixed costs of gathering and processing country-specific information give rise to herding behavior, even when investors are rational. Because of information costs, there are equilibria in which the marginal cost exceeds the marginal gain of gathering information. In such instances, it is rational for investors to mimic market portfolios. When a rumor favors a different portfolio, all investors "follow the herd."
Trade Linkages
Some recent models have revived Nurkse's (1944) classic story of competitive devaluations (Gerlach and Smetts, 1996) . Nurkse argued that since a devaluation in a one country makes its goods cheaper internationally, it will pressure other countries that have lost competitiveness to devalue as well. In this setting, a devaluation in a second country is a policy decision whose effect on output is expected to be salutary, as it induces expenditure-switching (i.e. reduces imports, increases exports, and improves the current account.) An empirical implication of this type of model is that we should observe a high volume of trade among the "synchronized" devaluers. As a story of voluntary contagion, this explanation does not square with the fact that central banks often go to great lengths to avoid a devaluation in the first place (often by engaging in an active interest rate defense of the existing exchange rate, as in Lahiri and Végh, 2003) or by enduring massive losses of foreign exchange reserves nor that devaluations have often been contractionary.
Financial Linkages
Other studies have emphasized the important role of common creditors and financial linkages. The "type" of the common creditor may differ across models but the story tends to remain consistent.
In Shleifer and Vishny (1997) Similarly, Calvo (1998) has stressed the role of liquidity. A leveraged investor facing margin calls needs to sell asset holdings. Because of the information asymmetries, a "lemons problem" arises and the asset can only be sold at a firesale price. For this reason, the strategy will be not to sell the asset whose price has already collapsed, but other assets in the portfolio. In doing so, however, other asset prices fall and the original disturbance spreads across markets. Kodres and Pritsker (2002) develop a rational expectations model of asset prices to explain financial market contagion. In their model, assets' long run values are determined by macroeconomic risk factors, which are shared across countries, and by country-specific factors. Contagion occurs when "informed" investors respond to private information on a country-specific factor, by optimally rebalancing their portfolio's exposures to the shared macroeconomic risk factors in other countries' markets. When there is asymmetric information in the countries hit by the rebalancing, "uninformed" investors cannot fully identify the source of the change in asset demand; they therefore respond as if the rebalancing is related to information on their own country (even though it is not). As a result, an idiosyncratic shock generates excess co-movementcontagion-across countries' asset markets. A key insight from the model is that contagion can occur between two countries even when contagion via correlated information shocks, correlated liquidity shocks, and via wealth effects are ruled out by assumption, and even when the countries do not share common macroeconomic factors, provided that both share at least one underlying macroeconomic risk factor with a third country, through which portfolio rebalancing can take place. Their model, like the rational herding model of Calvo and Mendoza (1998) , has the empirical implication that countries with more internationally-traded financial assets and more liquid markets should be more vulnerable to contagion. Small, highly illiquid markets are likely to be under-represented in international portfolios to begin with and, as such, shielded from this type of contagion. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) focus on is the role of commercial banks in spreading the initial shock. The behavior of foreign banks can exacerbate the original crisis by calling loans and drying up credit lines, but can also propagate crises by calling loans elsewhere. The need to rebalance the overall risk of the bank's asset portfolio and to recapitalize following the initial losses can lead to a marked reversal in commercial bank credit across markets where the bank has exposure.
Other Explanations
The so-called "wake-up call hypothesis" (a term coined by Morris Goldstein, 1998) relies on either investor irrationality or a fixed cost in acquiring information about emerging markets. In this story, once investors "wake up" to the weaknesses that were revealed in the crisis country, they will proceed to avoid and move out of countries that share some characteristics with the crisis country. So, for instance, if the original crisis country had a large current account deficit and a relatively "rigid" exchange rate, then other countries showing similar features will be vulnerable to similar pressures (see Basu, 1998 , for a formal model).
Channels of Propagation: The Empirical Evidence
As discussed, some theoretical models emphasized trade linkages as a channel for the cross-border propagation of shocks, while most models have looked to financial markets for an explanation.
Perhaps because trade in goods and services has a longer history in the post World War II period than trade in financial assets, or because of far better data availability, trade links have received the most attention in the empirical literature on channels of contagion. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) find evidence that trade links help explain the pattern of contagion in 20 industrial countries over 1959 -1993 . Glick and Rose (1999 , who examine this issue for a sample of 161 countries, come to the same conclusion. Glick and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) also study trade linkages which involve competition in a common third market. While sharing a third party is a necessary condition for the competitive devaluation story, Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2000) Other studies focused primarily on financial channels of transmission. Frankel and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) show evidence to support the idea that US-based mutual funds have played an important role in spreading shocks throughout Latin America by selling assets from one country when prices fall in another -with Mexico's 1994 crisis the being a prime example. Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (1999) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) , and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) focus on the role played by commercial banks in spreading shocks and inducing a sudden stop in capital flows in the form of bank lending, especially in the debt crisis of 1982 and the crisis in Asia in 1997. Mody and Taylor (2002) link contagion to developments in the US high yield or "junk" bond market. The common thread in these papers is that, without the financial sector linkages, contagion of the fast and furious variety would be unlikely. Thailand's devaluation in 1997, and Russia's devaluation in 1998. 6 In each case, we consider the possible trade channel, whether the affected countries shared similar characteristics with the crisis country and with each other, and whether a common creditor was present with the possible financial channel. Indeed, Table 3 lays the foundation for our unholy trinity of financial contagion proposition, which the next section discusses in greater detail. Several features summarized in Table 3 are worth highlighting. In all five cases, a common leveraged creditor was present, making it consistent with the explanations offered by Schleifer and Vishny (1997), Calvo (1998) , and discussed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) . In three of the five cases, the scope for propagation via trade links is virtually nonexistent and in one of the two remaining cases (Thailand) the extent of third party competition is with Malaysia, not the other affected Asian countries. Lastly, with the exception of the countries that suffered most from Russia/LTCM fallout, the affected countries tended to have large capital inflows and relatively fixed exchange rates.
Summing Up

The Unholy Trinity: Capital Inflows, Surprises, and Common Creditors
Having summarized some of the key findings of the literature on contagion, we now return to our central question of why contagion occurs in some instances but not in others.
The Capital Flow Cycle
Fast and furious contagion episodes are typically preceded by a surge in capital inflows which, more often than not, come to an abrupt halt or sudden stop in the wake of a crisis. The inflow of capital may come from banks, other financial institutions, or bondholders. The debt contracts typically have short maturities, which means that the investors and financial institutions will have to make decisions about rolling over their debts -or not doing so. With fast and furious contagion, investors and financial institutions are exposed to the crisis country and often highly leveraged. Thus, the investors can be viewed as halfway through the door, ready to back out on short notice.
This rising financial exposure to emerging markets is not present to nearly the same extent in the crises without major external consequences. Financial crises that have not set off major international dominos have usually unfolded against low volumes of international capital flows. Given lower levels of exposure, investors and institutions in the financial sector have a much lower need to adjust their portfolios when the shock occurs. In many instances, because the shock is anticipated, portfolios were adjusted prior to the event.
In all five of the examples from Evidence that quieter episodes were more anticipated than the fast and furious cases is presented in Table 5 . Standard and Poor's credit ratings had remained unchanged during the twelve months prior to of the Mexican and Thai currency crises. In the case of Russia, the credit rating is actually upgraded as late as June 1998 when the broader definition that includes Credit Watch (CW) status is used. The CW list lists the names of credits whose Moody's ratings have a likelihood of changing. These names are actively under review because of developing trends or events which warrant a more extensive examination. Two downgrades eventually take place prior to the crises on August 13, 1998 and again on the 17 th , the day before the default. By contrast, Argentina has a string (five) of downgrades as it marched toward default, with the first one taking place in October 2000, over a year before the eventual default. Likewise, Brazil and Turkey suffered downgrades well before the eventual currency crisis.
As further evidence that markets anticipated some of the shocks and not others, Figure 3 plots of the domestic-international interest rate differential for the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) and the EMBI+ for two of the contagious episodes (Mexico and Russia, top panels) and for two crises without immediate international repercussions (Argentina and Brazil, bottom panels). 7 The patterns shown in these four panels are representative of the behavior of spreads ahead of anticipated and unanticipated crises.
(The vertical axis is measured in basis points, so a measure of 1000 means a gap of 10 percentage points between the domestic borrowing rate and the international benchmark.)
If bad things are expected to happen, risk increases and spreads should widen. The overall message is that fast and furious episodes are accompanied by sharp spikes in yield differentials -reflecting the unanticipated nature of the news --whereas other episodes have tended to be anticipated by financial markets.
The top left panel of Figure 3 , which shows the evolution of Mexico's spread in the pre-crisis period is striking. In Mexico, spreads are stable at around 500 basis points in the months and weeks prior to the December 21, 1994 devaluation. Indeed Mexico's spreads remained below 1,000 until the week of January 6, 1995. Russian spreads, illustrated in the top right panel of Figure 3 , show remarkable stability until a couple of weeks prior to the announcement and default. In the case of Russia, the devaluation of the ruble appears to have been widely expected by the markets, as evident on the spreads on ruble-denominated debt. One can conjecture that it was either the actual default or the absence of an IMF bailout (following on the heels of historically large bail-out packages for Mexico and Korea) that took markets by surprise.
The data presented in Figure 3 bottom panel illustrates the fact that markets foreshadowed turbulence in the cases of Argentina (2001) and Brazil (1999) . The left bottom panel of Figure 3 presents evidence for interest rate spreads for Argentina and shows that the cost of borrowing began to rise steadily and markedly well before its default on December 23, 2001. In effect, since the week of April 22,spreads began to settle above 1,000 and since July 20 the never fell below 1,500. The bottom right panel of Figure 3 shows Brazilian spreads. There is a run-up in spreads well before Brazil floats the real on February 1,1999. This chart also reveals that Brazil-more so than Argentina-was quickly and markedly affected by the Russian crisis.
In sum, we have provided suggestive evidence that anticipated crises are preceded by credit ratings downgrades and widening interest spreads before the crisis while for unanticipated crises the downgrades and widening of spreads come during the crisis or after the fact.
Common Creditors
As noted, international banks played an important role in the transmission of some of the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1980s it was U.S. banks lending heavily to Latin America while in the 1990s it was European and Japanese bank lending to Asia, the transition economies and, in the case of Spanish banks, Latin America. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the role that commercial banks and mutual and hedge funds have played in the recent contagion episodes.
International bank lending to the Asian crisis countries grew at a 25 percent annual rate from 1994 to 1997 (or at a pace of about US$40 billion inflow per year.) At the onset of the crisis, European and Japanese banks' lending to Asia was at its peak at US$165 and US$124 billion, respectively, while the exposure of US banks was much more limited. Japanese banks had the highest exposure to Thailand, which also accounted for 26 percent of their total lending to emerging markets (the largest representation of any emerging market country in their portfolio.) Collectively, the Asian crisis countries (excluding the Philippines, which did not borrow much from Japanese banks), accounted for 65 percent of the emerging market loan portfolio of Japanese banks. For European banks, the comparable share was 23 percent. Following the floatation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997, the exposed banks retrenched quickly and cut credit lines to emerging Asia.
The bank inflows quickly became outflows of about US$47 billion.
As with Asia, lending to transition economies had accelerated in the mid-1990s.
In the three years before the Russian crisis, international bank lending to the region grew at 14 percent per annum. German banks were more heavily exposed to Russia, with lending to Russia averaging about 20 percent of all their lending to emerging economies.
As with earlier fast and furious contagion episodes, bank flows to the region, which oscillated around US$28 billion per year in the years before the crisis, turned into a US$14 billion dollar outflow in the year following the crisis. This retrenchment in lending helps explain why other transition economies were affected by the Russian crisis.
However, it fails to explain why Brazil, Hong Kong, and Mexico come under significant pressures at this time. To understand these and other cases, we need to turn our attention to non-bank common creditors. The Thai crisis in 1997 also triggered equity outflows through mutual funds from Asia. As discussed in Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2002) , the countries most affected by abnormal withdrawals were Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, the countries with the most liquid financial markets in the region. As was the case of the Mexican crisis, these were the countries to which mutual funds were heavily exposed. Of the portfolio allocated to Asia, 30 percent was directed to Hong Kong, 7 percent to Singapore, and 13 percent to Taiwan. They estimate that abnormal withdrawals (relative to the mean flow during the whole sample) oscillated at around 10 percent for the three economies.
Similarly, highly leveraged funds seem to have had an important role in the speculative attack against Hong Kong dollar in August of 1998 following the Russian crisis see Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001) . According to the Financial Stability 
Concluding Reflections
To date, what has distinguished the contagion episodes that happened from those that could have happened seems to have had little to do with more "judicious" and "discriminating" investors-nor with any improvements to boast of in the state of the international financial architecture. If investors behaved in a more discriminating manner in the recent crises where contagion could have happened but did not, it is because: i) those crises tended to unfold in slow motion and were thus widely anticipated; and ii) the capital flow bubble had been pricked at an earlier stage, when those same investors were more "exuberant" and iii) hence, the "common creditor" we have stressed in our discussion was less leveraged in these episodes. When looking back into history, one is struck by an overwhelming sense of "déjà vu. It certainly seems a mystery why episodes of financial crises and contagion recur, in spite of the major costs associated with crises (this would seem to provide a sufficient motivation for avoiding them.) But based on historical experience, there appears to be little hope that during the good times future generations of sovereign borrowers or investors will remember that the four most expensive words in financial history are "this time it's different."
If history is any guide, financial crises will not be eliminated-as Kindleberger noted, they are hardy perennials. But it should be possible, based on the understanding of what causes contagion and what does not, for countries to take steps to reduce their vulnerability to international contagion.
Contagion appears to be linked to a substantial inflow of capital to a country. Of course, the prospect of financial autarky as a way of avoiding fast and furious contagion is not particularly attractive as a long run solution. In fact, it may not even be feasible when countries have already liberalized the financial sector and the capital account. But before turning to the issue of capital account restrictions, it is critical to remember that in many crises (most of those discussed here and many others), the lead and largest borrower in international capital markets during the boom periods are the sovereign governments themselves. As Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) observe, it is the most debt intolerant countries with a history of serial default that can least afford to borrow that usually borrow the most. Often the outcome is default.
So, as a first important step, the risk of contagion would be reduced if policymakers in countries that are integrated with world capital markets remember that many a surge in capital inflows often ends in a sudden stop-whether owing to homegrown problems or contagion from abroad. As a consequence, prudent policymaking would at a minimum ensure that the government does not overspend and overborrow when international capital markets are all too willing to lend, as most of those episodes end in tears. In contrast, fiscal policy in emerging markets currently tends to be markedly procyclical, with countries engaging in expansionary fiscal policy in good times and contractionary fiscal policy in bad times (Talvi and Végh, 2000) . Fiscal reforms aimed at designing institutional mechanisms that would discourage such procyclical behavior (particularly on the part of "provinces" or other autonomous entities) appear as an essential ingredient in preventing future crises from building up. Such consistent self discipline, however, on the part of governments has historically proved elusive.
As regards to curbing private borrowing from abroad, the issues are even more complex. The best case for restrictions on international financial inflows would seem to focus on debt contracts with short maturities that are denominated in a foreign currencywhich have been the trigger in many modern contagion episodes. But although such policies may help in tilting the composition of capital flows toward longer maturities, their overall long-term effectiveness is unclear. Curbing capital outflows, once contagion and the ensuing sudden stop has occurred, is even more problematic.
Experience has shown that capital flight has been an endemic problem for countries that have tried to turn the clock back and re-introduce tight capital account and financial restrictions amidst economic turmoil. More fundamentally, pervasive capital controls hardly seem likely to be the solution in the medium and long run to the contagion and sudden stop problem.
As to new mechanisms in financial centers that could curb these periodic bouts of Net capital flows to Finland had risen from less than $2 billion in 1988 to $9 billion at their peak in 1990. Portfolio flows, which were about $3 billion in 1988, however, hit their peak prior to the crisis in 1992 at $8 billion.
In 1989 private net capital flows to the European Union (EU) were about $11 billion (US dollars) in 1992, on the eve of the crisis these had risen to $174 billion. 1 The international financial turmoil that followed Russia's default was compounded in a significant manner by another negative surprise announcement: on September 2, 1998 it became public knowledge that Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), owing to its large exposure to Russia and other high-yield assets, had gone bankrupt.
2 As Brazil is Argentina's largest trading partner, the sharp depreciation of the real (about 70 percent between January and end February) left the Argentine peso overvalued.
Similarly, through its extensive financial and trade links, Uruguay's economy (as it has through history) would be whiplashed by the Argentine crisis. episodes of financial crises, see Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) , Bordo and Murshid (2000) , Kindleberger (2000) , and Neal and Weidenmier (2002.) total return of each instrument is first computed, and then aggregated by marketcapitalization-weight. 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 European 
